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By L.A. PONOMAREV
Chairman, Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Commission 
for Investigation of the Coup d'Etat of August 1991
The security organs are currently going through a period of conservation. Rank-and-file 
officials of the Russian Federation Security Ministry (MBRF) are constantly finding, to 
their disappointment, that the perestroika process initiated after the collapse of the 
August 1991 putsch is now grinding to a halt. Some might say that this is only natural. 
Perhaps the secret services have learned the main lessons from the past, and in 
particular have gotten rid of the most odious figures who had held top positions, and are 
now concentrating on new missions that will ensure that the reforms are truly effective.
Have the necessary lessons in fact been drawn from the history of the security organs? 
One should examine first the KGB's role in the attempted coup d'etat. In my view, the 
KGB became the principal executive agency for carrying out the putsch for two principal 
reasons:
• It was able to act without any outside control. Its activities remained virtually 
unsupervised either by parliament or by the Ministry of Justice. Correspondence was 
opened in arbitrary fashion, telephone conversations were bugged, and other illegal 
operational measures were undertaken. The extent of illegality was so great that not 
even the Russian president was spared. During the course of the perestroika years 
the number of politically motivated investigations not only was not reduced, but on the 
contrary even rose significantly.
• The USSR KGB was a monopoly structure which conducted, in addition to political 
investigations, both intelligence and counterintelligence. It also controlled a substantial 
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number of militarized formations, the Soviet border troops, government 
communications, the USSR Presidential Guard, and the Presidential Information 
Service.
 
Indeed, that lack of supervision and the KGB's monopolistic power enabled the 
organization to carry out the preparations for the putsch. Similarly, these factors made it 
possible for it to persuade a large number of Soviet leaders of the need for a coup 
d'etat.
Has anything now changed as far as control of the security agencies is concerned? One 
inevitably comes to the conclusion that there has been virtually no improvement. During 
the course of the commission's work, involving parliamentary hearings on KGB 
participation in the coup, complaints were heard from parliamentary deputies, 
journalists, even from a government minister, that their conversations were being 
bugged. The successor organization to the KGB still is able to undertake technical 
measures directed against its opponents, with virtually no risk that legal action will be 
taken against it, for the simple reason that the ministry is able to arbitrarily destroy 
documents that it considers undesirable, or alternatively to dispense with documentation 
altogether, with the result that it always remains "pure." Just as civil rights were violated 
in the past, they are still being violated today.
It is true that the Russian parliament has set up a temporary parliamentary commission 
to monitor the reorganization of the security organs. However, the commission's work is 
conducted under a blanket of secrecy; moreover, it appears to be extremely ineffective. 
To this day no legislation has been adopted dealing with the security organs. This 
means that the security ministry still has no clearly defined missions laid down in law.
At the same time, new staffing rosters for the central Security Ministry as well as for its 
local administrations and the regional military counterintelligence departments are being 
automatically approved—approved, in my view, in a purely formal manner. The 
corresponding appointments to posts in the ministry currently are going ahead at full 
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speed, and the entire staffing process is taking place in accordance with the old 
hallowed nomenklatura methods. The outcome is that numerous local subdivisions of 
the MBRF have been left untouched, meaning that the possibility remains that "witch-
hunts" will be carried out in the future.
The result of the parliament's footdragging over passing a series of laws to provide legal 
status for the MBRF's activity is that the ministry is not being afforded the opportunity to 
transform itself from a "warlike detachment of the party" into a civilized security service, 
and to perform missions that are important for the welfare of the population, such as 
combating the mafia, preventing sabotage, fighting crimes committed by state officials, 
solving violent crime, and so on. Corruption is rampant, and this situation gravely 
compromises the new Russian government and the whole reform process, as well as—
most unfortunately—the authority of the president personally.
Within the bureaucracy of the former KGB essentially no reforms are being undertaken
—indeed no reforms are feasible. It is important to bear in mind that none of the current 
leaders of the security organs is capable of reforming the institution: Former chairman 
Kryuchkov is being replaced either by his own proteges, such as Ivanenko, or by 
generals from the party "Old Guard," such as Bulygin. Although these individuals will 
soon have to retire, their posts will be occupied in turn by bureaucrats of no less 
conservative views. Consequently the final result will still be zero. In fact, in a number of 
cases the exact opposite has occurred. Some of the officials who came out in 
opposition to the August plot and supported the Russian president were subjected to 
persecution, and this persecution is still continuing.
Alarmingly, even after the breakup of the USSR KGB into several independent 
structures subject to the President (as was advocated by the Parliamentary Commission 
for the Investigation of the Coup d'Etat), a kaleidoscopic series of different nameplates 
and acronyms (e.g., AFBRF, MBVDRF, MBRF), the abolition of a number of 
administrations and departments both in the central ministry and at the local level, as 
well as a shakeup among top ministry officials, in my view no radical, significant 
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changes whatever have occurred within the Ministry of Security. The following points 
need to be made:
•  Just as before, a number of MBRF organs in the central ministry as well as locally are 
headed by generals and other high-ranking officers who soiled themselves with 
complicity in the USSR State of Emergency Committee—the putsch group. In the case 
of some of these individuals, where documentation was available attesting to their 
support of the State Emergency Committee and to actions implementing the 
committee's decisions, two parliamentary commissions (one headed by A.M. 
Obolensky and the other headed by myself) informed former USSR KGB chairman 
V.V. Bakatin and current First Deputy Russian Federation Minister of Security A.A. 
Oleinikov of this evidence. However, no action was taken.
The high-ranking officers in question, who during the August putsch showed contempt 
for the USSR and RSFSR Constitutions and carried out the decisions of the State 
Emergency Committee, officers who felt nostalgia for the past, represent today a 
social basis for future coups d'etat and thus constitute a potential threat to society. 
These officials are making use of their official positions and the powers they possess 
in order to resist both openly and secretly the reforms being carried out by the 
president and the government of Russia. There have been many instances of their 
deliberately crushing initiatives undertaken by democratically minded officers serving 
in the MBRF.
• USSR KGB officers and officers belonging to the Moscow City and Moscow Region 
KGB Administration who participated in the administrative arrest of RSFSR People's 
Deputies and carried out illegal measures directed against Russian leaders and 
Russian People's Deputies (e.g., V.G. Urazhtsev, G.P. Yakunin, and V.V. Aksyuchits) 
have not been disciplined in any way. The fact that no importance has been attributed 
to violations of the law means that similar acts may still be committed in the future.
• It is incomprehensible that no action has been taken in regard to Colonel General I.Ya. 
Kalinichenko, former head of USSR KGB Border Troops. On August 19, 1991, 
Kalinichenko signed a series of directives for the unconditional execution of decisions 
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taken by the State Emergency Committee and ordered the distribution of these 
directives in accordance with the line of command. Despite this, Kalinichenko 
subsequently was promoted to a higher post, which he still occupies.
• The activity of both the central Russian Federation Ministry of Security and its local 
divisions has been virtually paralyzed. As was discussed earlier, no legislation has 
been passed defining the missions of the security organs. The "temporary statute" of 
the MBRF, signed by Russian President Boris Yel'tsin on January 24, 1992, originated 
in the depths of the ministry itself. Currently, all that is being performed is mechanical 
work connected with the confirmation of staffing and appointments of top officials.
In order to justify in one way or another its existence as a state agency and to 
demonstrate to public opinion its usefulness and the valuable functions it fulfills, the 
Security Ministry is undertaking tasks on its own initiative. These tasks, however, bear 
no relation whatever to state security and lie outside its sphere of competence. Take 
for instance the creation of departments for combating smuggling and fighting 
corruption in regional government administrations. The task of solving these problems 
is being placed on the shoulders of officers who have no specific training for this and 
previously had been employed for political investigations.
The MBRF military counterintelligence organs, which, since the 1930s have been 
noted for their extreme conservatism, are incapable of being reformed. Moreover, 
these institutions do not need to exist on the quantitative and qualitative scale that 
they do now. Their sole preoccupation at present is with trying to prolong their 
existence. The ineffectiveness of these military counterintelligence organs is 
demonstrated by the example of the USSR KGB Special Departments Administration 
(Osobye otdely) in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. During the course of its 
46-year existence, a total of about 5,000 officers served in this administration. 
However, to the best of my knowledge, over the entire period not a single case of a 
Soviet serviceman recruited as an agent by a foreign intelligence service was ever 
uncovered. Nonetheless the concept of such an operational counterintelligence 
mission against foreign agents never underwent review. One can conclude that it suits 
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the top command of the military counterintelligence organs to have large numbers of 
personnel: The larger the staff is, the more slots there are for generals and colonels.
Many operatives of the security services, particularly at the regional level, see how 
slowly the reform process is moving—both in Moscow and locally—and are forced to 
observe the way that the top-ranking officers are holding on to their jobs for dear life 
and are succeeding in crushing democratically minded officers by putting pressure on 
the officers' collectives to which the latter belong. As a result they feel compelled to 
leave the security services in order to find suitable employment for themselves, given 
their knowledge and their years of experience, outside the security ministry, and end 
up working for joint enterprises and other types of business where personal initiative 
and knowledge are justly appreciated.
• The system of professional education and retraining for top MBRF cadres has 
remained totally unchanged. Despite the high intellectual level of the instructional staff 
of the MBRF Higher School and the excellent teaching facilities, course work is 
conducted on the basis of manuals dating from the 1970s and 1980s. The final-year 
students spend their time studying the history of Soviet state security and cases taken 
from the life and work of F.E. Dzerzhinsky and other "chekisty," as well as the 
operations of the infamous "Chrezvychaiki" ("Extraordinary Tribunals") that were 
responsible for organizing mass terror and carrying out gross violations of legality in 
the Soviet Union. Indeed, the very name of this worthy educational institution 
perpetuates Dzerzhinsky's name, and there are still busts of Lenin on its landings and 
communist emblems on display. In addition, the correspondence courses taken by 
military counterintelligence officers and operatives of the ministry's regional security 
divisions are completely out of date. These courses stress form rather than real 
content.
 
In my view, the following measures need to be taken for effective reform of the state 
security system if there is to be not just verbal reform, but real change:
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• A legislative package defining every aspect of the operations of the ministry and its 
employees must be adopted without delay;
• Staffing for the security organs should be carried out exclusively in accordance 
with the missions legitimately assigned to the MBRF;
• All employees who have been guilty of violations of laws or complicity with the 
coup plotters must be dismissed from the service;
• Key posts should be occupied predominantly by persons in possession of a 
profound legal culture; and
• All employees of the security organs should be civil servants, not members of the 
military.
 
I believe that if these principles are adopted and implemented we will finally have proof 
that reform of the security organs has truly been completed.
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